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Social Assistance and the Challenges of
Poverty and Inequality in Azerbaijan,
a low-income country in transition
NAZIM N. HABIBOV
LIDA FAN

Although low-income countries in transition are facing the challenges
of poverty and inequality, evidence on the performance of safety nets in
these countries is scarce. This article uses micro-file data from a nationally
representative household budget survey to analyze the existing social
assistance programs in Azerbaijan, a low income country in transition,
from the perspectives of poverty and inequality reduction. The empirical
evidence presented in this paper indicates that the poverty and inequality
reduction effectiveness of social assistanceprograms is inadequate. First,
the benefits are very modest and the poor receive only a small proportion
of them. Second, some programs are not aimed at poverty reduction by
design. Third, the heterogeneous nature of poverty and the significant
scale of shadow economy during transition make the identification of the
poor complicated. Finally, the existing patchwork of numerous programs
with small-scale benefits is costly and administratively demanding. A
consolidated and better designed social assistance program is needed to
effectively tackle the challenges of poverty and inequality in Azerbaijan.
Keywords: Income distribution,welfare, poverty, inequality,safety net,
social assistance, transition,and Azerbaijan

Starting with the same ground of the Soviet-style social assistance of the 1990s, countries of the former Soviet block have
demonstrated divergent patterns in reforming their social welfare
safety nets. However, most of the literature regarding social assistance reform focuses on the Baltic or Slavic countries, while the
development of social assistance systems in the low-income transitional countries of Central Asia and Caucasus has been largely
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2006, Volume XXXIII, Number I
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ignored (Klugman, 1997; Manning, 2004; Manning & Tikhonova,
2004; Rimashevskaia, 2003; Whitefield, 2002). This study attempts
to fill this gap in the literature by focusing on the assessment of
social assistance in Azerbaijan, a low-income transitional country,
located on the Caucasus between Russia and Iran. There are two
major benefits of this study. First, the analysis in this study is
based on high-quality micro data from a nationally representative
household budget survey. Second, the analysis of social assistance is relevant for Azerbaijan given that the government of the
country has recently reiterated a commitment to reform social
assistance in the framework of the Poverty Reduction Program of
Azerbaijan (GoA, 2004; 2005).
ZU4

Background: Social Assistance and Transitional Shocks
Until 1991 Azerbaijan was a part of the USSR, and the development of social assistance in the country followed the unified
Soviet model that had three major legs. The first leg was a broad
net of cash benefits for several categories of households such as
families with children, veterans, the disabled, elders, parentless
children, and certain categories of workers such as miners and
teachers. Thus, by the end of 1980s, families with children in the
Soviet Union were eligible for up to 10 types of benefits which
were effective tools in decreasing child poverty and promoting
women's employment (Bradbury & Jantti, 1999; OECD, 1996).
The second leg included: day care, sport, food and leisure services
subsidized by the state-owned enterprises, as well as consumer
goods, housing, transport, communication and utilities subsidized by the budget revenue of the state. It is estimated that the
consumer and producer subsidies together accounted for about
10 percent of GNP by the end of 1980s (Rashid et al., 2000). The
third leg was the centrally-planned economy with primarily state
ownership of the means of production, which guaranteed full
employment and made unemployment assistance unnecessary.
The first years of transition were marked by profound economic crisis in Azerbaijan, which negatively affected all three
legs of social assistance. First, privatization of the economy made
guaranteed full employment impossible. Employees of the former
state-run enterprises were forced to move to the informal sector
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of employment that exceeded 38 percent in Azerbaijan (Yoon et
al., 2003). As a result, the share of shadow economy of the total
GDP of the country grew to 60 percent (Schneider, 2002). Second,
by the year 2003, the private sector share of GDP reached more
than 70 percent (MED, 2003). The former state-run enterprises
reemerged as privately-owned companies and ceased playing
an active role in delivering social assistance benefits, considered to be inappropriate for profit-oriented businesses. Third,
the government's capability to administer social protection was
severely undermined by the profound decline in state revenues.
Consequently, Azerbaijan lagged far behind the high and middle
income countries of the former Soviet Union in public spending
for social programs (Table 1).
Economic depression, multiplied by the dismantling of the
Soviet-style social assistance, led to a sharp increase in poverty
The poverty rate, the share of the total population living below
the poverty line, grew in Azerbaijan from 33 percent in 1989 to
50 percent in 2001 (Falkingham, 2004). In total, about 24 percent
of the population of Azerbaijan or 1, 860,000 people live under
the international extreme poverty line of 2.15 USD PPP/day
(Falkingham, 2005). In addition, the determinants of poverty
have changed. Determinants of poverty were fairly homogenous
before the transition: the majority of the poor were pensioners,
families with a large number of dependents or single mothers
(Klugman, 1997; Manning & Tikhonova, 2004). Since the transition began, poverty has become more diffused, and demographic
characteristics have ceased to be strong determinants of poverty.
Finally, the impoverishment was accompanied by a significant increase in inequality. The Soviet society was fairly equal in
terms of income; before the independence of Azerbaijan, the Gini
coefficient, a measure of inequality, was only 0.27 in the country
(Falkingham, 2004). By the end of a transition decade, in 2000, the
Gini coefficient nearly doubled to 0.50.
Objectives of the Study
Responding to the rising poverty and inequality during transition, the government of Azerbaijan has administered new social
assistance programs. However, on the basis of the data sketched
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in the previous section (e.g. high level of poverty and inequality),
the actual impact of social assistance on poverty and inequality
is expected to be minuscule. This intuitive observation allows us
to articulate the two objectives of this study. First, this study attempts to quantify the performance of social assistance programs
in Azerbaijan from the perspectives of poverty and inequality
reduction. Second, it seeks to provide specific recommendations
to improving the existing social assistance programs.
Data
Collecting data about income distribution in Azerbaijan has
a long history, the Family Budget Survey (FBS), a nationwide
survey of family income, was administered in Azerbaijan quarterly since 1922 (Dmitrichev, 1992). However, the FBS was extensively criticized for being unrepresentative of the total population
and providing misleading information about income distribution
(Flemming & Micklewright, 2000; Micklewright & Marnie, 2005;
Shenfield, 1983). In 2003, the State Statistics Committee of Azerbaijan, the national statistical agency, introduced a new survey,
the Azerbaijan Household Budget Survey (AHBS). The new survey is an instrument from a "familyhood" of the Living Standards
Measurement Surveys developed by the World Bank to assess
poverty in developing and transitional countries. In this section,
we provide a brief description of the distinguished features of
Azerbaijan's survey, since the Living Standards Measurement
Surveys has already been described in detail elsewhere (Deaton,
1997, Grosh & Glewwe, 2000).
The AHBS is a cross-sectional annual survey collecting
information about demographics, housing, education, health,
economic activities, and consumption and expenditure of households. It employs three-stage probability sampling with preliminary stratification by regions and by urban and rural areas. As a
rule, each quarter about 2,000 new households participate in the
survey, meaning that the total sample contains about 8,000 households per year. Importantly for the analysis of income poverty and
inequality, the survey contains a diary where daily income and
consumption are recorded by participants. In our analysis, we
use the data set of 2003, a micro file containing records of 33,731
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individuals in 8,525 households. We use the weight variable contained in the micro-file to make the survey representative to the
total population of Azerbaijan.
Overview of Programs
Currently, all social protection programs in Azerbaijan can
be broadly classified as social assistance and social insurance.
Under the term "social assistance" we include all social programs
which are: (1) paid from the general revenue of the state to the
population deemed to be poor, (2) included in the social assistance
line item of the state budget, and (3) administered by the state
social protection agencies. Social insurance, a Pay-As-You-Go
scheme, is paid from mandatory contributions of employees and
employers to provide protection from the loss of income as a result
of old age, disability, death of bread earners, sickness, maternity
and unemployment. However, this study focuses only on social
assistance.
Table 2 reports household-level descriptive statistics about
the social assistance programs as estimated from the AHBS. In
total, all social assistance programs reach 11.47 percent of the total
population and provide them with an average of 92,366 AZM1
benefits. Among them, Children Benefits is the only incometested social assistance program in Azerbaijan and the only program with an explicit poverty-reduction mandate. The Children
Benefits provides cash income for families with children assumed
to be poor. The program covers about 0.09 percent of households
and consumes 1.16 percent of total social assistance expenditures.
Procedures of eligibility determination for the Children Benefits
consist of a categorical test to determine how many children are in
an applicant's family and an income-test to determine the salary
of the applicant. Should the results of categorical and income-tests
prove that the family's income per capita for the previous quarter
is less that the eligibility level of 16,500 AZM, the applicant is
eligible for the benefit.
All the other social assistance programs in Azerbaijan are
categorical, meaning that no income or consumption of claimants
is assessed. Rather, eligibility for benefits is based on belonging
to the designated categories assumed to be poor. Thus, Scholar-
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Table 2
Household descriptivestatisticsfor social assistanceprograms

Programs
Total
Children benefits
Scholarships
Social Pensions
Karabakh benefits
Chernobyl benefits
Child disability
Other benefits

Program
participation
Rate
(%)

Mean
benefit per
Recipient
AZM

Program share
in total social
assistanceexpenditures
(%)

11.4
0.09
2.30
2.30
0.04
0.04
0.62
5.19

92,366
136,537
17,562
107,830
103,167
83,394
91,559
110,090

100.00
1.16
3.38
35.00
0.46
0.31
5.32
53.89

Sources: Authors' calculations based on AHBS (2003).

ships provide benefits to full-time students and redistributes 3.38
percent of total social assistance benefits. Social Pensions provide
protection for the elderly who do not qualify for a social insurance
pension because of the lack of contribution to the Pay-As-You-Go
scheme. Social Pensions redistribute 35 percent of the total social
assistance budget which makes this program the second largest
program by expenditures after the Other Benefits. Scholarships
and Social Pensions have a similar participation rate-2.3 percent of the households-and are the second and the third largest
programs by coverage after the Other Benefits.
Karabakh and Chernobyl benefits are aimed at households
with disabled members during the Karabakh conflict with Armenia (1988-present) and disabled from the Chernobyl nuclear accident in Ukraine in 1986. These programs have the same participation rate: 0.04 percent, and redistribute a similar amount of total
social protection expenditures: 0.46 and 0.31 percent respectively.
Child Disability provides benefits for households with disabled
children by redistributing 5.32 percent of the social assistance
budget to 0.62 percent of the households.
The Other Benefits is the largest program both by coverage
and by expenditures among all social assistance programs: 5.1
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percent of the households and 6.9 percent of total social protection expenditures. One category of the Other Benefits is the
merit-based privileges for war and labor veterans, and citizens
decorated with orders and medals. Another category is the occupational benefits for personnel of civil, security and military
services, and some other government organizations. This category provides exemption from or discounts for rents, utility payments, electricity, telephone service, medicines, medical appliances, medical care and urban transportation as well as vouchers
to spas and summer camps.
Poverty Measurement and Poverty Redcution Effectiveness
Quantification of poverty depends on the selection of standards which can substantially affect the results of poverty measurement. These standards include welfare indicators (income
or consumption), equivalence scales, poverty lines and poverty
indexes. In this section, we briefly describe the specific standards
used in this study.
We choose to use consumption, not income, as the welfare
indicator of poverty. As compared with consumption, income is
underreported in the AHBS, which can affect the outcomes of
computations (GoA, 2005). In addition, consumption is a better
indicator of poverty than income for households which consume
a significant amount of home-made products. Since there is no
consensus regarding what equivalence scale is more appropriate
for transitional countries, we choose to use a per capita equivalence scale. By using this scale, our study is also consistent with
the previous poverty assessments made in Azerbaijan (GoA, 2004,
2005, World Bank, 2003b). Per capita consumption is estimated
by dividing total consumption of a household by the number of
people in the household.
We choose to use two poverty lines set up by State Statistics
Committee of Azerbaijan. The official poverty line in Azerbaijan
is computed as the cost of consumption of 2,200 calories and
includes additional allowances for non-food goods and services
of 30 percent of total costs. There is also an extreme poverty
line that does not include the costs of the allowances and can
be referred as the food poverty line. The official and food poverty
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lines were set up for the year of 2003 as 178,850 and 124,137 AZM
per capita per month accordingly (GoA, 2004). To measure poverty we select three indexes from Foster, Greer and Thorbecke's
(1984) "family", namely, poverty rate, poverty gap and poverty
severity. The poverty rate shows the percentage of people in the
total population whose consumption is below the poverty lines.
The poverty gap indicates the shortfall of the consumption of
the poor from poverty lines as an average of all people in the
population. The poverty severity measures inequality among the
poor by giving more weight to the poorest of the poor.
As the primary purpose of social assistance transfers is to lift
beneficiaries out of poverty, poverty reduction effectiveness is
one of the major characteristics of a social assistance program. To
quantify the effectiveness, the poverty rate, gap and severity are
recomputed in the absence of social assistance benefits to estimate
how the poverty indexes would be affected if no social assistance
programs existed. Thereafter, poverty reduction effectiveness is
computed in the following way (Sainsbury & Morissens, 2002):
PE =

(Pprior - Ppost) X 100 / Pprior

Where PE is the poverty reduction effectiveness of social assistance
in percentage, and Pprior is the poverty indexes before the receipt of
social assistance benefits, and Ppost is the poverty indexes after the
receipt of social assistance benefits.
The general impression from the data is that poverty is widespread in Azerbaijan-44.6 percent live below the official poverty
line and 9.64 live below the food poverty line. In comparison,
poverty is not very deep as the poverty gap is relatively small0.0882 and 0.0132 for the official and the food poverty lines
respectively Poverty severity is also relatively limited-0.0256
for the official poverty line and 0.0030 for the food poverty line.
Taken together, these findings are important for our analysis by
indicating that the majority of the poor are clustered just below the
official and food poverty lines in relatively concentrated groups.
The poverty indexes are, therefore, fairly unstable and can easily
be changed. Consequently, the poverty status of the poor is highly
sensitive to even a small variation in consumption including
variation triggered by change in the amount of received social
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transfers. In particular, it is important for the food poverty line,
where the number of poor is small and the poverty line itself is
set too low.
Table 3 presents the poverty reduction effectiveness of social
assistance in Azerbaijan. As shown, only the Other Benefits and
Social Pensions demonstrate relatively greater effectiveness by
decreasing the poverty rate by 27.79 and 21.37 percent respectively. By contrast, Scholarships and Child Disability benefits
have less satisfactory performance by decreasing poverty rate
by 2.33 and 4.08 percent respectively. All other social assistance
benefits have a relative effectiveness of less than I percent.
Looking from the perspective of poverty gap and severity
reduction, a similar picture can be observed. The Other Benefits,
Social Pensions and Child Disability have the most effect in reducing the poverty gap-69.23, 56.00 and 16.46 percent respectively.
They also are most effective in reducing poverty severity-90.83,
81.37 and 37.50 percent correspondingly. All other social assistance benefits have negligible effectiveness in reducing both the
poverty gap and severity.
Taken together, the findings suggest that social assistance
programs do reduce poverty. However, poverty reduction effectiveness is inadequate-the number of the poor is still alarmingly high after the receipt of all social assistance benefits. The
results also show that different programs have varying impacts
on poverty. Among all of the analyzed programs, the Other Benefits have the best performance followed by Social Pensions and
Child Disability, while other programs demonstrate minuscule
effectiveness.
Inequality Measurement and
Inequality Reduction Effectiveness
Combating poverty is an important but not the only goal of
social assistance programs. The inequality reduction may also be
considered as an important indicator of how effective social assistance is. It is also noteworthy that in contrast to social insurance
benefits reflecting past earnings, social assistance can potentially
play a more direct role in redistribution of wealth by channeling
more benefits to the lower strata of the population regardless of
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the work history or amount of previous contributions made by
the poor.
To measure inequality this study chooses to use the Gini
coefficient, one the most commonly used inequality measures.
The higher the Gini coefficient, the higher the level of inequality.
Using the Gini coefficient has advantages insofar as it satisfies
three important principles: (1) anonymity-it does not take into
account who the wealthy and poor are; (2) scale independenceit does not take into account the size of economy, wealth of the
country and the size of population of the country; (3) transfer
principle-if income is transferred from the wealthy to the poor,
the Gini coefficient demonstrates more equal distribution. As a
rule, the Gini coefficient is expressed in the percentage form as
the Gini index that is equal to the Gini coefficient multiplied by
100. The disadvantage of using the Gini is that it is highly sensitive
to selection of units of analysis (e.g. individuals or households),
grouping (e.g. deciles or quintiles), and welfare indicators (e.g.
income or consumption). As a result, the reported Gini may fluctuate greatly For instance, for Azerbaijan in 2002, the United Nations' inequality database reported that Gini exceeded 50 percent,
while the Azerbaijan government reports that the Gini is about
27 percent (GoA, 2004; UNU-WIDER, 2005). However, this study
concentrates on measuring the Gini before and after social assistance transfers rather than on measuring the Gini per se. Thus,
we avoid the impact of sensitivity to the results of computations.
Although it is more common to calculate the Gini of income,
this study uses the coefficient computed on the base of consumption. This allows us to overcome underreporting of income in the
data set and to provide consistency with poverty analysis. The
units of analysis are households and the welfare indicator is per
capita consumption.
The second column of Table 4 demonstrates the Gini index
before receipt of social assistance benefits. As expected, our result
for 2003, 21.35 percent, is different from the previously reported,
but closer to the figure reported by the Azerbaijan government
for 20022. After this, we recalculate the Gini index in the absence
of social assistance benefits to measure how inequality would
change without social assistance programs. Hence, the inequality
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Table 4
Inequality reduction effectiveness of social assistancein Gini index (%)
Programs

Inequality reduction
Gini after
Gini before
receipt of benefits receipt of benefits
effectiveness

Total
Children benefits
Scholarships
Social Pensions
Karabakh benefits
Chernobyl benefits
Child disability
Other benefits

21.805
21.372
21.363
21.541
21.358
21.361
21.374
21.590

21.359
21.359
21.359
21.359
21.359
21.359
21.359
21.359

2.045
0.061
0.019
0.845
-0.005
0.009
0.070
1.070

Source: Authors' calculations based on AHBS (2003).

reduction effectiveness is computed as the following (Kopri &
Palme, 1998):
IE =

(Gprior - Gpost )

x 100 /

Gprior

Where IE is the inequality reduction effectiveness of social assistance
in percentage, and Gpnor is the Gini index before receipt of social
assistance benefits, and Gpost is the Gini index after receipt of social
assistance benefits

The results of computation are presented in the third column
of Table 4. In general, social assistance programs do decrease
inequality. However, the magnitude of the impact is minuscule.
The inequality reduction effectiveness of all social assistance programs taken together is about 2 percent. Two programs, namely,
the Other Benefits and Social Pensions are the most successful
in inequality reduction with an effectiveness of 1.070 and 0.845
percent respectively. All other programs also reduce inequality,
but their effectiveness is almost negligible. The notable exception
is Karabakh benefits which slightly increase inequality.
Allocation of Benefits
To investigate why the poverty and inequality reduction of
social assistance is inadequate, we need to focus on the allocation

216

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

of social assistance benefits to different groups of the population.
In this section, households are ranked by deciles based on their
per capita consumption to assess take-up, allocation efficiency,
and benefit generosity of social assistance programs. Although
we analyze the allocation of benefits to the total population,
we especially test the extent to which benefits affect the poor.
As shown in preceding sections, about 9.6 percent of the total
population of the country lives below the food poverty line which
is almost equal to the poorest decile. Consequently, we assume
that the bottom decile represents the most vulnerable (Braithwaite
et al., 2000; Milanovich, 2000).
Take-up
Take-up of social assistance benefits can be analyzed from the
perspectives of horizontal and vertical efficiency (Atkinson, 1995;
Beckerman, 1979). Horizontal efficiency indicates inclusiveness
of the program and is measured by the Error of Exclusion, an
indicator showing how many poor are erroneously excluded
from the participation in the programs. The Error of Exclusion is
computed as the percentage of the poorest population not covered
by social assistance to the total percentage of the poor:
Ee = D1.

/ D1

Where Ee is the Error of Exclusion, and Dl, is the number of the poor
not receiving social assistance benefit in the first decile, and D1 is
the total population in the first decile.
On the contrary, vertical efficiency indicates to what extent
coverage of social assistance programs is restricted to the poor and
can be measured by the Error of Inclusion, an indicator showing
what percentage of the non-poor are "mistakenly" covered by the
programs. The Error of Inclusion is computed as the percentage
of non-poor participants covered by social assistance to the total
percentage of participants in the program:
Ei = (D 2+D3+D4+. .. +D10 ) / (D+D 2+D3+ • .. +D10)

Where E, is the Error of Inclusion in percentage, and Dl,. . . D10 are
the percentage of non-poor participants covered by social assistance,
meaning the first, second,. . . and tenth deciles, respectively, and
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D10 is the total percentage of participants in the

Table 5 exhibits the take-up of social assistance programs, the
Error of Exclusion and Error of Inclusion. In general, the Error
of Exclusion is very high. About 87 percent of the poor living
in the first decile do not receive any support from current social
assistance programs. On the other hand, the Error of Inclusion
is considerably high. About 89 percent of households covered
by social assistance are not the poor. The same picture can be
observed for separate programs. Some programs, namely, Chernobyl and Children benefits do not cover the poorest households
and have the highest errors of exclusion of the poor-100 percent
both. Even the programs that attained the best performances such
as the Other Benefits and Social Pensions, still allow a high Error
of Exclusion of the poor-94.87 and 95.21 percent respectively.
The general impression from these findings is that the existing
social assistance programs are not pro-poor. The main problems
in the take-up of social assistance programs are the exclusion of
the poor and the inclusion of the non-poor.
Allocation efficiency

Having been deemed an important performance indicator,
social assistance take-up fails to take into account the variation
in the share of social assistance transfers received by households.
For instance, even if the poorest and the wealthiest deciles have
the same number of households covered by a program, the actual
proportion of benefits received by those households can be different. Hence, the proportion of benefits collected by deciles must
also be assessed to measure what share of total social assistance
benefits reach the poor (Coady & Skoufias, 2004).
The results of the computations are presented in Table 6 and
provide two interesting insights. First, overall, the allocation efficiency of social assistance is minuscule, only a small share of social
assistance benefits reaches the most vulnerable. Households in
the first decile receive only 12.6 percent of total social assistance
benefits. Nevertheless, as the first column in Table 6 demonstrates,
distribution of social assistance benefits is progressive with the
amount of benefits steadily decreasing with the growth in the
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households' consumption. Likewise, the poorest decile receives
almost twice as much transfer from various social assistance programs as the wealthiest decile. Second, the programs are very
different in allocation efficiency. Karabakh Benefits achieve the
highest efficiency by providing more than half of the total benefits
for the poorest decile. Social Pensions and the Other Benefits
exhibit to some extent progressive allocation of the benefits. By
contrast, other social assistance programs do not have clear pattern of benefit allocation.
ZZU

Benefit generosity
Benefit generosity shows the proportion of benefits in the
total consumption of different groups of population. Assessing
the benefit generosity permits us to estimate the importance of
social assistance benefits for each decile of the population (Gilbert
& Van Voorish, 2003).
The benefit generosity of social assistance programs is shown
in Table 7. In general, benefit generosity is low for all analyzed
social assistance programs inasmuch as benefits comprise only
a small fraction of consumption for all deciles. However, in relative terms total social assistance benefits are marginally more
important for the poor than the non-poor. In total, social assistance benefits comprise about 11.86 percent of total income of
the poor households and 1.35 percent of the non-poor. Again,
the performance of separate programs is divergent. The Other
Benefits and Social Pensions are the most important programs
for the poor. They provide the largest shares in consumption of
the poor-6.39 and 4.24 percent respectively. On the other hand,
other social assistance programs are less important to the poor,
their shares in consumption in all the deciles are almost negligible.
Summary and Implications for the Future Reforms
This article focuses on the effectiveness of social assistance
in Azerbaijan, a low-income country in an era of transition from
the centrally-planned to a market economy. The findings of this
paper demonstrate that social assistance has decreased poverty
and inequality Nevertheless, a significant number of people,
44.6 percent, are still poor. Furthermore, about 10 percent of the
total population lives below the food poverty line. Therefore, the
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performance of current social assistance should be improved to
tackle the challenges of poverty and inequality. But, first of all,
the reasons for modest performance should be identified.
Empirical evidence presented in this paper shows that the
unsatisfactory performance of social assistance programs can be
attributed to four major factors: (1) the benefits transferred to
the poor are too small to significantly decrease the existing poverty and inequality; (2) some programs do not have an explicit
mandate to reduce poverty and inequality; (3) the programs officially aimed at poverty reduction often have minuscule ability
to identify the most vulnerable; and (4) the existing network of
many programs with almost negligible benefits may be costly and
administratively demanding.
The first and the most important factor for the ineffectiveness
is the lack of funds to finance social assistance programs. The
benefits are too low to "correct" poverty. As outlined, the reason for the low level of benefits is the overall low government
spending per capita and as a percentage of GDP, which is caused
by a weak economy and the comparatively small size of the
total GDP. However, even if more resources were to be allocated
to the existing programs, without taking into consideration the
three other factors of inefficiency, the outcomes would still be
insufficient.
The second factor is that even these scarce resources are distributed inefficiently by allocating a significant share of funds to
the programs with low poverty reduction performance. Current
social assistance programs suffer from high Errors of Exclusion
and Inclusion. Comparison between programs, however, should
be made with care insomuch as they have different objectives.
Some programs evaluated in this study such as Karabakh and
Chernobyl Benefits do not have the explicit objective to confining benefits to the poor. Nevertheless, measuring poverty and
the inequality-reduction effectiveness of these programs seems
necessary under the current circumstances. Widespread poverty,
inequality and general economic insecurity associated with transition in Azerbaijan have elevated the importance of social programs aimed at reducing poverty. There is also significant pressure to increase the impact of social assistance on poverty and
inequality At the same time, budgetary pressure limits the gov-

Social Assistance and the Challenges of Poverty and Inequality

223

ernment's ability to increase the amount of benefits. Confronted
with tight fiscal constraint, the government may have no other
option but to adopt a more narrow approach by allocating more
resources to the programs targeting the poor.
Third, the problem is further aggravated by the large number
of the poor. In such circumstances, priority should be given to the
most vulnerable, perhaps those who live in extreme povertybelow and close to the food poverty line. To cover more of the extremely poor and to provide them with a larger share of benefits,
the social administrators need to know who the extremely poor
are. Assessing poverty status of household is extremely difficult
because of the diffused nature of poverty during transition and
a large size of the informal economy. Current social assistance
programs are not able to identify the most vulnerable. As shown,
neither income-test nor categorical assistance is sufficient to properly assess the poverty status of households.
However, international experience shows several approaches
to administering social assistance programs when poverty status
cannot be easily assessed. One approach is community targeting,
identified as contracting out social assistance programs to a community that will identify recipients, deliver benefits, and monitor
and evaluate program implementation based on locally-agreed
notions of poverty, deprivation, need or capabilities (Conning &
Kevane, 2002). The underlying premise of community targeting
is that community members are in a better position to identify
the most vulnerable among themselves than social assistance
workers. The transitional countries have already had some experience with implementing community targeting schemes for
poverty reduction. For example, Uzbekistan has implemented
the "Mahalla" scheme since mid-1990s (Micklewright & Marnie,
2005). Under the scheme, each community is provided with a part
of the country's total social assistance budget. A committee comprised of the most respected representatives of the community is
entrusted to allocate the benefits to the households according to
local knowledge about their needs.
Another approach is proxy-mean targeting, identification of
the poor by easily observable characteristics such as education,
gender, age, access to a plot of land and clean water, possession of cars, and size of apartments. These characteristics, called
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"proxies", can be used to statistically predict the poverty status
of a household (Abdul Naga, 2003; Bisongo & Chong, 2001). The
households exhibiting the identified set of proxies are classified
as the poor and receive social assistance benefits. A well-known
example of a proxy-mean targeted program is the "Opportunidades" (formerly "Progressa") program in Mexico.
Fourth, after an appropriate method of allocating benefits is
selected, it is useful to create a single poverty reduction benefit instead of continuing the existing hodgepodge of programs.
Consolidating several benefits into one allows for decreasing
administrative costs and increasing the amount of the benefit to
the level required to lift beneficiaries out of poverty.
Finally, however efficient and effective social assistance might
be, it is not a panacea for poverty during transition. Social assistance is only one element of a broader system of social protection
that should be gradually developed in Azerbaijan. Other elements of the system such as pensions, unemployment insurance,
maternity leave and sickness benefits should also be developed
concurrently with the reforms in social assistance. In addition,
social assistance is a fairly passive mechanism: it applies when
a person or a household has already fallen into poverty. Hence,
more pro-active strategies such as investments in education and
health care, and access to inexpensive credit resources should also
be used to achieve poverty reduction.
Notes
1. Manat is Azerbaijan's currency. According to Azerbaijan's Central Bank, USD
1 = Manat 4,911.11 in average for the year of 2003. (www.nba.az / eng /statistics
/monetaryindicators/ offical _2003.shtml)
2. Neither the UN nor the Azerbaijan government fully disclose the details of
their respective Gini calculations.
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